Somewhere, sometime between Mariupol and Gori lurks Vladimir Putin’s elusive strategy – that mysterious, impenetrable objective which ceaselessly confounds the brightest tactical analysts in the business of warfare and its dissection. The unremarkable truth is that the Kremlin is employing the same old violence and autocratic fear mongering used by the dictators and despots of centuries past. It simply is just repackaged in the ambiguous – in unanswerable, unaccountable, and uncontrollable violence, and it is hidden in plain sight.

Putin’s new warfare is, above all things, cowardly. What seems to be cunning strategy – baffling the most senior of analysts – is concealed by its sheer simplicity. Putin is very simply waging a haphazard war while hiding behind a conventional declaration of peace.

It has been seven years since Russian tanks rolled through the Roki tunnel in an invasion that brought Russian forces 40 kilometers from Georgia’s capital. To this day those forces remain inside Georgia in a state of occupation – that innocuous-sounding word for a perpetual state of invasive violence. Twenty percent of Georgian territory remains invaded. In recent months, on what seems to be a weekly basis the FSB, masquerading in the costume of the “South Ossetian” “border” guard, has been pushing the boundary line of the puppet regime further and further into Georgian territory.

Georgia has always been a country of origins, and with this most recent conflict, it’s no different. To understand what is happening currently in Ukraine one must look at what happened in Georgia. Saakashvili’s “blunders,” his taking the Russian bait in the days leading up to the the August 8th invasion should be noted. But Putin himself has boasted that he and his cronies planned the Georgian invasion years in advance. What was carried out in Georgia rather clumsily in 2008, was then perfected in 2014 with the taking of Crimea and those little green men.

Yet just as understanding Georgia will give insight into Putin’s future moves, understanding what is happening in Eastern Ukraine will provide insight into the future of Georgia’s conflict. The following is an analytical synopsis of the evolving and continuous conflict in Ukraine after a year of war and in Georgia after seven.

Some have called the conflict between the Ukrainian military and Russian-backed separatists a fake or phony war. But tell that to the families of troops who have died on both sides. It’s not a fake war; it’s just a different war. This conflict, which has seen everything from the appearance of “little green men” (actually rather large Russian-speaking soldiers), intimidating troop build-ups, relentless propaganda and stealth invasions, is very likely the shape of things to come. As regional consultants Gregory Maniatis and Molly McKew have argued, Russian President Vladimir Putin started “a pop-up war – nimble and covert – that is likely to be the design of the future.”.

Yet the long-anticipated invasion and siege of Mariupol, with the ultimate aim of establishing a land bridge to Russian-annexed Crimea, has not happened. This shouldn’t be surprising. As we have seen elsewhere, Putin’s approach is gradual. He will slowly chip away at the country, keep his troops active and pushing forward bit by bit until he gets what he wants.

The 2008 war in Georgia is the quintessential example. The international community paid little or no attention to the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia there until Russian tanks nearly rolled into the capital, Tbilisi, and the Russian government gave the breakaway territories formal recognition. To this day, Russian-backed separatists have managed to carve away and hold on to 20 percent of Georgia’s land.

Putin’s tactic is to occupy a breakaway region, recognize it and slowly expand it over time, a recent example being an incident a month ago when Russian-backed forces from South Ossetia put up signs marking their “border” pushing farther into Tbilisi’s territory. The placards were placed within sight of one of Georgia’s largest highways and a mile-long section of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa pipeline.

Such conflicts are never fought on just one front. During the initial invasion of Georgia, once Tbilisi’s troops were routed in South Ossetia, Russian forces came through Abkhazia. When the focus is on one area, Putin changes to a different one. Annex Crimea, and while all the world watches and the media deliberate, move into Ukraine through the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. It’s the basic algorithm for pop-up war.

The next step seems to be to wait until the media has stopped paying attention. Eventually people are no longer going to read stories about an invasion and siege of Mariupol that hasn’t happened. And that’s exactly when it will happen. For Putin, the strategy is to make a small move and then wait. Either the move is not large enough to make it into major headlines, yet is a slight tactical gain, or the headlines get exhausted by pundits and leaders who cry wolf.

Think of the war in Ukraine as a large open wound that has not been allowed to heal. Infection has set in. The entire country’s immune system is overloaded and all other activity is suffering. The longer the wound is kept open the more it will fester. Hate and extremism will gather on all sides until they begin to confirm the propaganda of their enemies. Panic begins to spread. The Baltic countries call for more NATO assistance, and the entire structure of NATO is rattled. Former Soviet countries see it as a reminder of what happens when they mess with Mother Russia. The U.S. reacts with drills across NATO borders, even sending military advisors and equipment into Ukraine, as outlined in the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014.

In response to NATO and U.S. exercises like Operation Atlantic Resolve throughout NATO countries from the old Eastern Bloc, and Operation Fearless Guardian in Ukraine, Russia stages reactive exercises from Crimea to the Arctic – which directly imply a nuclear narrative and preemptive strikes against NATO.

The result? We’re looking at the biggest build-up and stand-off of U.S. and Russian troops since Berlin 1948.

Author: Joseph Epstein

Author: Will Cathcart