We can not entertain the conspiracy theories of the parties involved regarding the possibility of any type of manipulation after the ballots have been marked in some cases due to the visibility of the marking on the other side - there was not even a theoretical chance of a breach of secrecy if the frame envelope and the instructions for placing the ballot in the machine were used correctly, - on this central Giorgi Sharabidze, Deputy Chairman of the Election Commission, said.

As Sharabidze noted, the ballots were printed on high-grammage offset paper, which, according to him, is much thicker than the ballots used in the 2021 elections in Krtsanis district.

"In order to accurately inform the public, we would like to respond to some manipulative information spread in the social network and media, which the interested parties use to discredit the election process. In social networks and media, a video or photo of the so-called Evidence that, in the opinion of their distributors, constitutes facts of improper interference in the election process or premeditated violation of the secrecy of the vote. After the efforts of interested parties to duplicate voters in the verification machine were completely refuted by the report of the American auditing company, which emphasized that it is impossible to duplicate a voter in the voter list, in the last two days, the discussion of its visibility on the other side of the ballot paper during the marking of ballot papers has become particularly frequent. This is evidence of a premeditated violation of the secrecy of the vote. First of all, it should be noted that the ballots were printed on heavy weight offset paper, which is much thicker than the ballots used in the 2021 elections in Krtsanisi District. Also, the ballots were printed in appropriate manner in the selected printing houses and this process was observed by both local and international observers. In addition, a special frame envelope was made by the Central Election Commission from such thick paper that, if the ballots were placed correctly, secrecy was fully preserved. This has been repeatedly tested during pilots and testing, and recommendations from non-governmental organizations have been taken into account in this process. The fact that the frame envelope provided full concealment was noted by various media and public representatives. It is worth emphasizing the fact that during the campaign to inform the voters, the election administration paid special attention to the instruction on the use of the frame envelope. In addition, all steps of the voting procedure were posted publicly in all precincts. Therefore, if the framed envelope and the instructions for placing the ballot in the machine were used correctly, there was not even a theoretical chance of a breach of secrecy. Accordingly, the election administration provided all means related to these issues, both informationally and materially. The coloration reportedly seen on the other (back) side of the ballot is generally faint and indistinct. Although it may be slightly imprinted, it does not in any case clearly reveal the exact choice made by the voter, which preserves the secrecy of the vote. The secrecy of the voter's choice is ensured, even if it is strongly colored or darkened, which may be visible to the other side, but in no case the choice is determined. "We cannot follow the conspiracy theories of the interested parties involved in some cases after the ballots are marked, due to the visibility of the marking on the other side, regarding the possibility of any type of manipulation," said the Deputy Chairman of the CEC.

He also responded to other information about violations spread through social networks and media, including information that a specific subject was pre-marked with a dot on the ballots.

"In connection with the ballot, on the day of the election, photos were also circulated, which showed that it was as if a specific subject was marked with a dot on the ballots in advance. We would like to emphasize that during the counting process, not a single ballot was found with a similar marking. It is important to note that no complaint was filed regarding this matter. The impression remains that the only task is an informational attack on the perceptions of the public, so that in this information flow, the public will no longer be able to distinguish truth from lies and blindly believe the information provided, as happened in the case of the "comparison" of the population census data and the number of voters. Even the spreaders of this data themselves had to admit that later. A second and much more important trend has emerged regarding the scientific methods of voter flows and data, which convinces the public that such a flow of voters is questionable. Leaving aside the fact that in many cases, such studies are based on data from one or two precincts, the authors of these calculations often forget that there were at least two and at most five verification machines at the polling stations, as well as at least two and at most three vote counting machines. Accordingly, voter services at polling stations are performed not sequentially, but in a parallel mode, which the authors of such studies must take into account. We emphasize that the election administration conducted a number of stress tests regarding the capacity of the polling stations, and based on this, we announced in advance that there would not be a problem of long queues at the polling stations. Consequently, even in the conditions of the highest voter turnout since 2012, voters were served without any obstacles. Diagrams and comments about the statistical study of voter activity in individual precinct election commissions and the findings of the mathematical study of the distribution of votes in these precincts are also being circulated on social networks. It should be noted that in general this method is known to the election administration and many elections held in Georgia have been the object of such studies, however, one of the main rules of this methodology is that such studies do not prove anything by themselves and it only indicates possible anomalous deviations that will allow the election administration to additionally investigate the so-called Activity data on "suspicious" sites. Due to the fact that we do not know the methodology of the research carried out for this election, the number of investigated districts and regional distribution, it will be difficult for us to make any comments at this stage, however, we are ready to cooperate with all objective researchers, in case of their real interest. It should be noted that according to the good practice of cooperation, the methodology of such studies, statistical information and other data are first discussed with the election administration and only then become public. In this case, unfortunately, the opposite is happening, which is a matter of serious doubt and concern. Another false information that we want to address is related to voice counting machines. Several users of the social network reported that the machines had a ballot replacement function and every second ballot was changed in favor of a particular subject. We emphasize that the machine cannot change the voter's vote either physically on the ballot or software. The machine instantly and accurately records the expressed will of the voter and it cannot be changed. We would also like to remind you that the ballots of those polling stations, where the voting was conducted using electronic devices, were counted manually and are in agreement with each other. Accordingly, the distribution of the mentioned information is also part of the deliberate discrediting campaign of the election process. Video material is also being circulated, where the chairman of the Precinct Election Commission places the ballots in the vote counting machine. The broadcasters present the ongoing process on the video as if the activities of the chairman of the commission were a violation of the law. In fact, the video depicts the traditional, legally mandated procedure after voting at the polling station - placing the transfer box ballots into the main ballot box, in this case the vote counting machine. Such a case would be in all the polling stations where there was a transfer box and after the end of the voting, placing the transfer box ballots in the counting machine is provided by the procedure. And, of course, this procedure is well known to the interested parties, nevertheless, they are trying to mislead the public based on their political agenda. We would also like to respond to the information spread regarding the issue of marking, there is no evidence that the marking fluid did not leave an appropriate mark after use. Despite the fact that the press speaker of the CEC responded to this issue on the day of the elections and the effectiveness of the marking liquid was tested in the presence of the media through a public demonstration, the interested parties still continue to spread misinformation. It is clear to us that such statements are dictated by the political agenda, are speculative and serve to discredit the election process and elections in general. That is why the election administration will continue to provide the public with real, objective information regarding the elections and will not leave any misinformation or manipulation unanswered," said Giorgi Sharabidze.