On the seventh anniversary of the Russia–Georgia War, experts discussed the details of what set the war off and current actions being carried out by Russia in the disputed territories and beyond, in Georgia proper. While some believe Georgia provoked a war by saying it would bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia under central government’s control, others think the main responsibility for the war lies with the Russian government for straining the situation on the border with Georgia in early 2008 and eventually violating the international border by going not only into the South Ossetian autonomous republic, but into Georgia itself with a military force. Experts also believe that there are similarities in Moscow ‘s strategic reasoning and military conduct in its wars against Georgia and Ukraine. Stephen Szabo from Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund and Col. Bob Hamilton, professor at U.S. Army War College, shared their insights on the matter with Voice of America’s Georgian service

Stephen Szabo, Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund:

– It is a very complicated situation, even more complicated than Ukraine, in a sense that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been pretty much independent from Georgia for quite a while and did not want to be part of it. Georgia provoked hostilities a bit, but this provocation was exactly what Putin needed. He was actually baiting the current Georgian leadership so that he could make a point about this being a Russian sphere of influence. That’s what set off the war, I think. Russia did not have to react the way it did, but on the other hand, it was looking for an excuse. Nowadays, Putin wants to make a point that this is the Russian sphere of influence and both NATO and the West should keep out of these regions - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I th

ink the government of Georgia understands that while it lays claims to these lands, it cannot do much about the situation in the conflict areas.

Col. Bob Hamilton, professor at U.S. Army War College:

“Russia found itself provoked by a declaration of independence by Kosovo in early 2008 and there was at least some evidence of President Putin’s position on the issue: If Kosovo declared its independence, he would respond and Georgia would be part of that response. He also felt provoked by the language of the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008. It was then that Russia realized that the Summit also provided a window of opportunity. In other words, the Summit Communique made it clear that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO, but it also made it clear that these countries had no special status with NATO at the moment. So we started to see some escalatory steps in early spring of 2008, initially focused on Abkhazia - Russians inserted 500 more peacekeepers, although it was an airborne battalion and not a standard peacekeeping force, repaired a railroad which helped them logistically in the conflict later, issued a decree that allowed the Russian government to speak directly to the de-facto governments in Tskinvali and Sokhumi instead of going through Georgian government and lifted an embargo on Abkhazia. All these actions were designed to escalate the situation there. When Georgia did not rise to the bait in Abkhazia there was a period in May and early June of 2008 when things appeared to be de-escalating, but then, in early July, things started getting heated in South Ossetia and escalated until the conflict began. As far as assigning responsibility goes, personally I believe that the bulk of the responsibility for the conflict lies with the Russian government; I think it was a deliberate plan by Moscow to escalate the situation in an attempt to provoke Georgian response. As I said earlier - if Georgia did not respond, Russia would get what it wanted anyway - de-facto separation of these two provinces from Georgia. That mattered to Russia greatly, because it was clear by summer of 2008 that Georgia was bound for the West, bound to integrate with the EU and NATO, and Russia saw itself losing Georgia to the West. It was a struggle over geopolitical affiliation of a country that was strategically very important to Russia, and a decision was made to make sure that Georgia’s NATO aspirations and those of other countries such as Ukraine were dealt a blow.”

Stephen Szabo:

“I think the fact that the West did not support Georgia once its own territory was invaded - and do not forget the NATO summit at which the West made it very clear that it was very ambiguous about supporting Georgia - did send a lot of bad signals to Putin, and I think it opened the door not only to what happened there, but also to what is happening right now in Ukraine and Crimea. So I do think that the lack of a strong, unified Western resolve, the fact that EU was willing to compromise on the Sarkozy initiative that just froze the conflict and legitimized what Putin was doing is a very major mistake.”

Col. Bob Hamilton:

“I would not say there was a lack of attention from the West in July of 2008, but would say instead that many Western governments were surprised and caught off guard by how quickly the war in South Ossetia escalated and by the scale of Russian response. I would call it a “strategic surprise”. Plus, you cannot look at Ukraine in 2014 or 2015 in isolation from Georgia in 2008 or the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in early 90’s, Transnistria or the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. All these conflicts share a number of charachteristics. First is a pision of identities inside a state. That’s a legacy of Soviet ethno-federal policies. In Georgia, Soviet policies heightened distinctions between the Abkhaz and other Georgians or between Ossetians and Georgians. Same goes for Moldovans, Bessarabians and Transnistrians. There also happened to be political transitions, like end of Yanukovich’s tenure in Ukraine or collapse of the Soviet empire in Georgia. All these processes caused an escalation, while a third party intervened on behalf of another in the resulting conflict. Another interesting thing about these conflicts is that Russia - for military and strategic reasons, I assume - has always intervened on behalf of the separatist minorities. I think the reason for that is that they want to keep Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the Russian geopolitical sphere and make sure that they are either unable to move Westward or, even if they are able and willing, as Georgia is, they are not seen as an attractive partner for the West because of the instability that Russia has helped create there.”

Read the Georgian version of the article on Voice of America website.